Corporate Ownership and Control in the Financial Markets by Nicoll, Geoffrey
36 CANBERRA LAW REVIEW [(2011) 
 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
GEOFFREY NICOLL* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the different character of the legal ownership 
(trusteeship) and control (investment management) of funds remains 
evident today, despite the many overlapping trust and corporate 
features of the superannuation fund and the corporate entity 
responsible for managed investments. paper argues that the different 
character of the legal ownership (trusteeship) and control (investment 
management) of funds remains evident today, despite the many 
overlapping trust and corporate features of the superannuation fund 
and the corporate entity responsible for managed investments. 
 
I INTRODUCTION  
 
In 1981, RC Clark wrote ‘The Four Stages of Capitalism – Reflections on Investment 
Management Treatises’.1 In this important work, he traced the four stages of 
capitalism through a history of corporate ownership and control. In the first and 
second stages of Clark’s capitalism, the owner of the private firm or corporation is 
also its manager. As the larger corporation rises to prominence however, the corporate 
manager assumes greater control of capital provided by the owner/shareholder - the 
familiar thesis of Berle and Means.2 Both these early stages of capitalism have helped 
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(1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 561-582. 
2
 A A Berle and G C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan, 1932, Rev. 
ed. 1967) 1932. 
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lay the foundations for an era of managerialism which has encompassed agency 
theory in financial economics and preceded modern corporate governance.3  
 
By contrast with these first two stages of capitalism, stages three and four in Clark’s 
work suggested the significance of the financial markets and investment 
intermediaries, rather than the corporate form, in separating the ownership and control 
of capital. Writing in 1981, Clark considered that investment intermediaries were 
likely to garner control of investment funds and corporate capital from the beneficial 
owner of that capital in the third stage, although he expressed some difficulty in 
characterising the fourth stage. He speculated that the fourth stage might herald the 
rise of the ‘savings planner’ (or investment adviser) who seemed the most likely to 
secure ultimate control of investment capital from investors. Thus, the four stages of 
capitalism reflected three distinct steps in distancing the ultimate provider of capital 
from the control of that capital, and from corporate control when investing in 
corporations.  
 
Clark’s thesis has proven a remarkably close predictor of the way in which the 
ownership of Australian superannuation funds and their substantial control through 
investment intermediaries and financial products has evolved since 1997, when the 
Final Report of the Financial System Inquiry was published.4 A consideration of key 
events in the evolution of the Australian financial system since 1997 suggests that the 
                                               
3
 M C Jensen and W H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) Journal of Financial Economics 305-360; The division of corporate 
powers between the board (and management) on the one hand and the general meeting on the other is 
now reflected in s 198A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and routinely adopted as a replaceable rule 
in the constitutions of most corporations. 
4
 Financial System Inquiry Final Report , (Chair: S Wallis), Commonwealth of Australia, 1997. 
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essentially different character of the legal ownership (trusteeship) and control 
(investment management) of funds remains evident - despite the many overlapping 
trust and corporate features of the superannuation fund and the corporate entity 
responsible for managed investments.  
 
When superannuation funds choose  to invest in the shares of public companies as an 
asset class, as is now commonly the case, the different character and legal 
responsibilities assumed by the trustee and the investment manager become more 
clearly defined, giving rise to potential tensions in corporate monitoring and corporate 
governance. In particular, the ultimate responsibility of the trustee for an investment 
in shares to the ultimate beneficial owners of those shareholdings rests upon trust law. 
By contrast, the responsibilities of the investment manager, although now absorbing 
marked trustee responsibilities, have been cast essentially as corporate 
responsibilities.  
 
As was foreshadowed in the Final Report of the Financial System Inquiry, 
superannuation funds now provide the well-spring for a vast new range of investment 
forms and products.5 Further, pooled superannuation trusts and master trusts, 
organised as managed investment schemes under Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), lay the foundations for an expanded range of hedge funds, private equity 
funds and sovereign wealth funds in international markets. Most of these sources of 
corporate capital utilise in some measure the pool of savings now available for 
investment in superannuation funds. While the new financial products on offer in 
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Australia do extend the investment choices open to superannuation funds and their 
members, such investment choices when exercised through new investment products 
and vehicles also tend to distance fund members from the ultimate control over 
investment funds, and from participation in the corporations in which those funds may 
be invested as shareholders.  
 
These developments suggest the growing need to better define the roles of the trustee 
and investment manager in corporate governance. They also suggest new issues 
associated with the ownership and control of investment funds and, possibly, with the 
ownership and control of the corporations in which these funds invest. Because 
markets operate internationally, the obscuring of the ownership or control of major 
corporations through investment vehicles and products, such as hedge funds; private 
equity funds; and sovereign wealth funds, now gives rise to even more significant 
international issues on this front.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, one expectation of corporate governance was that pension (or 
superannuation) funds, acting as major shareholders for beneficial interests in the 
funds, might represent a wider range of stakeholder interests in monitoring corporate 
governance and corporate responsibility.6 But such faith in superannuation funds 
monitoring corporate governance appears to have been misplaced. A consideration of 
the uncertainties of corporate ownership and control within new investment forms and 
new investment products in the financial markets prompts questions as to whether 
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earlier hopes for corporate responsibility and good corporate governance may not be 
undone by the heavy dependence of trustees in practice upon investment vehicles and 
their products in the exercise of their investment powers, and by the increasingly 
remote beneficial interests represented by those vehicles and  products.  
 
II RISE OF SUPERANNUATION FUNDS AS MAJOR 
SHAREHOLDERS IN AUSTRALIA   
 
The broad picture of Australian share ownership today reflects the significant 
dependence of corporations upon superannuation, and superannuation – linked 
investment funds which have become major corporate shareholders and providers of 
corporate capital.7 This pattern of Australian share ownership is now reflected in the 
dominant position of the major insurance companies which provide superannuation – 
linked services and products. 
 
The same pattern of share ownership in Australia also reflects the Government’s 
response to a number of fundamental demographic, economic and political 
phenomena. These phenomena are common to most countries in the western world.8 
                                                                                                                                       
6
 See, particularly: M M Blair, Ownership and Control - Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 
Twenty-First Century (The Brookings Institution, 1995). See also: above n 9. 
7
 In Australia in 2004, the equity investments of superannuation funds outside life insurance offices 
represented 46% of their total assets. The figure had been just 29% in 1990. By 2005, equities and units 
in trusts held by life insurance companies represented 66% of their total assets and by 2004, equities 
and units in unit trusts held by superannuation funds represented 46% of their total assets. For both life 
insurance companies and superannuation funds, the growth in their equity holdings since 1990 was 
very significant, both in absolute terms and relative to their holdings of other assets. Data compiled 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistics: B14 Life Insurance Companies and B15 Superannuation 
Assets Outside of Life Offices, February 2006.  
8
 For valuable accounts of these influences at the time see: M M Blair, Ownership and Control – 
Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (The Brookings Institution, 1995); C 
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The steadily ageing Australian population has required governments to make 
increasing provision for spending on age pensions and health.9 For this reason, a 
privately funded superannuation system has become essential to Australia meeting the 
financial needs of its ageing population.10 Importantly, the superannuation system is 
required to marshal private savings for retirement – requiring in turn, the sound 
investment of superannuation funds and favourable taxation concessions.11  
 
Demographic and welfare constraints upon governments have therefore imposed upon 
individuals the obligation to save for their own retirement. The capacity of individuals 
and households to provide for their superannuation has been made possible by 
growing household wealth, although this has also been accompanied by higher levels 
of household borrowing.12 As a result of these different forces, superannuation has 
largely displaced other forms of savings by households.13   
 
In Australia, the first clear recognition of these developments is found in the Final 
Report of the Financial System Inquiry 1997, which noted the importance of 
superannuation – both as a new repository of national savings, largely displacing 
banks in this role, and as a source of investment funds available to finance 
                                                                                                                                       
K Brancato, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance – Best Practices for Increasing 
Corporate Value (McGraw Hill) 199; Hill J, Submission to the Inquiry into the Role and Activities of 
Institutional Investors in Australia, Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Securities, 1994, 62. For a more succinct version, see: ‘All Capitalists Now’, The Economist, 25-31 
October 1997, 69.  
9
 See: The Treasury, Overview to the Australian Government’s Intergenerational Report, Canberra: 
Budget Paper No 5, Budget Papers 2002-2003, 6. 
10
 Blair above n 8. 
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 Ibid. 
12
 Productivity Commission, Review of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 and 
Certain Other Superannuation Legislation, Canberra: Report No 18, AusInfo, 2002 at xvi. 
13
 Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 4, 13. 
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corporations.14 The Financial System Inquiry recognised the extent of 
‘disintermediation’ within the Australian market, with the role of traditional 
institutions being displaced by new investment products and services, and by new 
markets providing direct access to such products and services.15 As a result, the role 
of such intermediaries was seen to be diminishing with new products and market 
access making more choices directly available to consumers.16  
 
Responding to the disintermediation of financial institutions foreshadowed by the 
Financial System Inquiry, both banks and insurance companies quickly positioned 
themselves through a series of re-structures and strategic alliances to share in the 
growing wealth and investment management business associated with superannuation. 
A number of major insurance companies have de-mutualised, in part to offer fee-
earning investment management and trust administration services to other 
superannuation trustees.17 They offered new investment products such as pooled 
superannuation trusts and master trusts to smaller superannuation trustees.18 Banks 
                                               
14
 Ibid, 1-13. 
15
 The most evident institutional control over superannuation funds appears to be occurring in their 
stranglehold on master trusts, pooled superannuation trusts and wrap accounts. These are the 
investment ‘platform’ products into which small superannuation trustees must invest. See: below n 18. 
See also: R Bowerman, ‘The Turn of the Screw’, Asset, May 2002, 36-42. 
16
 Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 4, 8. 
17
 Virtually all the major Australian life insurance companies subsequently changed their status from 
mutual companies limited by guarantee to companies limited by shares. National Mutual demutualised 
in 1995 and AMP in 1998. One by-product of de-mutualisation was the generation of new business in 
offering investment management products and services. The value of the demutualisation of National 
Mutual Holdings (NMH) to the growth and returns of National Mutual Funds Management (NMFM), 
one division of MMH, was noted by the chief executive of NMH at the time. See: B Madden, ‘Team 
Effort Lifts NMFM to Winning Way’, Money Management, 30 October 1997, 13. The commercial 
importance of managed funds, relative to life insurance funds was also cited as a factor in AMP’s 
decision to demutualise. 
18
 One early reflection of this was the phenomenal growth reported in the funds invested in ‘platform 
products’ such as master trusts. Together, master funds and wrap accounts reportedly attracted net 
inflows of $6 billion in the June quarter of 2002. At the end of June 2002, a total of $138.4 billion had 
been invested through Master Funds and wrap accounts. See: S Hoyle, ‘The Big Boys Rule This 
Market, OK?’ The Australian Financial Review, 12 September 2002, 16. These master trusts, or 
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aligned themselves with investment managers as their deposit-taking business 
dwindled.19 Both banks and insurance companies created a range of new retail and 
wholesale investment management and personal superannuation products.20 
 
III SUPERANNUATION FUNDS AS THE FOUNT FOR NEW 
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS 
 
The importance of accumulating savings in superannuation funds to enable 
individuals to meet retirement needs has had another important effect that may in 
some measure be related to the credit bubble that has given rise to the Global 
Financial Crisis. In order to provide for their retirement, Australians appear to be 
accepting higher levels of risk in the investment of their savings. As a result, a greater 
proportion of household savings is now invested in shares, both directly and 
indirectly, through investment-linked superannuation. The extent to which 
superannuation and investment funds do now represent individual and household 
savings is apparent first, in the access of more individuals to superannuation funds;21 
second, in the broader range of superannuation funds and savings accounts now 
                                                                                                                                       
‘platform’ investment products, are offered usually by the largest insurance companies and banks and 
provide access to a wider range of investments for the smaller superannuation trustees of corporate 
employer-sponsored funds and industry funds. A marked feature of the figures in the ASSIRT Market 
Share Report, cited by Hoyle, is the size and dominance of the top nine institutions in this market.  
19
 In 2002, Westpac acquired Rothschild Australia Asset Management See: A Hughes, ‘Westpac Buys 
Rothschild’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 2002, 21. 
20
 See above n 17. 
21
 Superannuation Industry Overview (2011) APRA <www.apra.Government.au/insight/home.cfm>. 
88% of all Australian workers are now covered to some extent by superannuation. Almost 50% of 
those covered are members of retail funds and 30% are members of industry funds. The remaining 20% 
are members of employer-sponsored corporate funds, public sector funds and small funds. 
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available;22 and third, in the control increasingly sought by fund members over the 
investment of the superannuation funds held on their behalf.23 These strong links 
between household savings and superannuation, and between savings and investment, 
are confirmed in the Government’s recognition of the community’s ‘… strong interest 
in the prudent management and supervision of superannuation funds’.24 
 
The essential steps through which superannuation funds are first pooled into Pooled 
Superannuation Trusts and Master Trust ‘platforms’ and then re-invested as managed 
investments is demonstrated diagrammatically in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 maps 
broadly the four stages through which lines between financial investment institutions 
and their products are now easily blurred – one central finding of the Financial 
System Inquiry.25 Figure 1 also shows the way in which legal distinctions drawn in 
characterising funds as ‘superannuation’ or ‘investment’ funds, or as ‘wholesale’ or 
‘retail’ funds,  may be increasingly artificial. This in turn suggests that differences in 
the actual risk assumed by retail investors and the beneficiaries of superannuation 
funds may also be narrowing.  
                                               
22
 These include superannuation funds designated as Corporate, Industry and Public Sector funds 
respectively. However, there are also Retail Funds, Small Funds, Statutory Life Insurance Funds and 
Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs). The Trustees of Corporate, Industry and Public Sector funds are 
regulated under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). 
23
 The Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004 (Cth), 
foreshadowed since 1998, was finally passed in June 2004 and came into effect from 1 September 
2005. There is evidence on other fronts suggesting that members will seek greater control over the 
investment of their own superannuation funds. Employer-sponsored funds must make provision for the 
equal representation of employer and employee representatives upon the boards of the corporate 
trustees of such funds. Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), Part 9, s 89. Public offer 
funds have tended to grow at the expense of corporate and public sector funds (APRA, Superannuation 
Industry Overview, above n 12, 12). Likewise, there has been a significant growth in the popularity of 
self-managed DIY funds: J Wasiliv, ‘Fund Growth Recovers after Regulation Switch’, The Weekend 
Australian Financial Review, 8-9 February 2003.  
24
 Productivity Commission, above n 12, 14. 
25
 Financial System Inquiry Final Report, above n 4, 13. 
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Importantly to the central theme of this article,  Figure 1 also suggests the potential 
difficulties now likely to be found in distinguishing between the ownership of 
corporate ‘securities’ (particularly shares) and the ownership and control of the 
superannuation and investment funds now investing in corporate securities through a 
variety of ‘financial products’. 
 
Figure 1: Four Degrees of Separation in Corporate Ownership and Control 
 
A Legal character of the superannuation trustee as shareholder  
 
Owing to the fact that superannuation funds may now indirectly represent a range of 
broad public interests in corporations, a great deal has been expected of the trustee, 
not merely as a financial institution and investor but also as a major shareholder. 
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Throughout the 1990s pension funds in the United States became activist shareholders 
around the world. Beginning with a more active interest in employees’ wages and 
conditions, pension funds by the late 1990s were seen as potentially representative of 
broader public interests and causes. Commentators such as Margaret Blair saw this as 
an important development in redressing the ‘myopia’ of assumptions that the only 
appropriate social purposes of corporations could be that of maximising shareholder 
value.26  
 
In this respect, pension funds might be thought representative of ‘stakeholder’, as 
distinct from ‘shareholder’, interests. As we have seen, one difficulty in the 
superannuation trustee actually representing such interests in practice as an active 
shareholder is the trustee’s dependence upon investment managers and their products 
in practice. Commentators such as Ford and Worthington provide an excellent 
account of the very substantial difficulties posed by this fact in the context of former 
public unit trusts.27 Many of these same difficulties might be valuably considered 
afresh in the similar context of the relationship today between the superannuation 
trustee and investment manager, or in reconciling the trust and corporate 
responsibilities of the corporate entity responsible for managed investments.  
 
One threshold consideration is that the interests represented by superannuation funds 
under the SIS Act 1993 (Cth), and the capacity of the superannuation fund trustee to 
represent those interests as shareholder, rest ultimately upon several constitutional 
                                               
26
 See above n 7. 
27
 H A J Ford and S Worthington, ‘Public Unit Trusts’ in Subtitle 4.8, Laws of Australia, (Sydney: LBC 
Information Services). 
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sources of power within the Constitution. By reference to the Commonwealth’s 
pensions powers,28 the primary purposes of the superannuation trust are to make 
provision for the retirement of employees from employment, and related purposes. 
These constitutional powers underlie the core and ancillary purposes stated in s 62 of 
the SIS Act 1993 (Cth). However, the Commonwealth’s taxation power is also 
invoked to provide many of the taxation benefits and financial incentives needed to 
encourage private contributions to superannuation funds.29 This same power also 
provides the important constitutional foundation for the regulation of superannuation 
funds in the SIS Act 1993 (Cth).30 In order to qualify for taxation benefits, the fund 
must be a ‘regulated’ and ‘complying’ fund within the meaning of those terms in the 
Act.31  
 
Part 7 of the Act sets out certain provisions which are to apply only to ‘regulated’ 
superannuation funds. Section 19 details the requirements that must be met for a fund 
to be treated as a regulated superannuation fund. Subsection 62(1) of the Act requires 
that the trustee of a regulated superannuation fund must ensure that the fund is 
maintained solely for one or more of a number of ‘core’ purposes,32 or for one or 
more of a number of ‘ancillary’ purposes.33 It is clear that these core and ancillary 
purposes are directed to providing benefits for the members of superannuation funds 
in the event of a member’s death, retirement or termination of employment.  
                                               
28
 The Constitution, ss 51(xxiii) and 51(xxiiiA). 
29
 The Constitution, s51(ii). 
30
 A regulated superannuation fund has complying fund status for taxation purposes if it complies with 
Part 5, Division 3 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). 
31
 See above n 28. 
32
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 62(1)(a). 
33
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 61(1)(b).  
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Such core and ancillary purposes suggest the reasons why the trustee of a 
superannuation fund might be seen as a different type of shareholder – one possibly 
representative of broader public interests in employment, welfare and health. At the 
same time of course, the core and ancillary purposes of superannuation funds also 
suggest the reasons for intense governmental and political interest in superannuation 
funds and their investment.  
 
There are however, two significant obstacles to superannuation trustees pursuing 
broader social objectives on behalf of members. The first obstacle has been the way in 
which the trustee’s investment power in law has been construed in the light of the 
need to actively manage large trustee funds for investment – particularly in corporate 
shareholdings.  The central issue in this area was foreshadowed in Cowan v Scargill, a 
case decided in the English Chancery Court in 1985.34 The case has not received close 
consideration in subsequent case law. The presiding judge, the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert 
Megarry, later offered one reason why this has been so – suggesting that the case 
displayed no ‘bold novelty of approach’ owing in part to the fact that the defendant 
trustees represented themselves so that more difficult issues were not put to the Court 
in the alternative.35 Nevertheless, in deciding that the investment powers of the 
pension fund trustee should be exercised only for the financial ends of beneficiaries, 
rather than for any broader political or public purpose, the case laid important judicial 
                                               
34
 Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch. 270 (the Mineworkers’ Pension Case). For an excellent commentary on 
this case by the presiding judge, see: Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Megarry: ‘Investing Pension Funds: The 
Mineworkers’ Case’ in TG Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 1989). 
35
 Ibid 152, 159. 
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ground for the interpretation of the trustee’s investment powers in this context. For 
this reason, the cy of the case is considered in more detail in the next section. 
 
Another reason why the case has not received close attention is this has been an area 
in which the legal duties of the investment fiduciary have been largely overtaken by 
the utilitarian economics of market and corporate finance. The work of commentators 
such as Professors Langbein and Posner has conditioned trustees to accept that they 
lessen the overall risk of loss when they invest funds through diversified portfolios.36 
The statutory duties of the investing trustee in this context have been significantly 
conditioned by this thinking and by the efficient market hypothesis.37 In the Act, s 
52(2)(f) now requires the trustees of superannuation funds to diversify investments in 
their formulation of an investment strategy and this is largely seen by them as an 
answer to their legal duties in the exercise investment powers. Nevertheless, there 
remains an uncomfortable question as to whether the essentially personal duty 
imposed upon trustees in subs 52(2)(b) is satisfactorily answered by the essentially 
corporate approach to risk management articulated in s 52(2)(f) for superannuation 
trustees investing in corporate securities.  
 
B The legacy of Cowan v Scargill   
 
                                               
36
 Langbein and Posner, ‘Market Funds and Trust Investment Law’ (1976) 1 Am. Bar Found. Res. J; 
and ‘Social Investing and the Law of Trusts’ (1980) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 72. See also: Gilson and 
Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 at 549-550. For an 
Australian consideration of these articles see: WA Lee, ‘Modern Portfolio Theory and the Investment 
of Pension Funds’ in PD Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial Relations (The Law Book Company 
Limited, 1987). 
37See particularly the statutory covenant now imposed upon the investing superannuation trustee under 
s 52(2)(f). See further below.  
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One significant limitation upon the capacity of the superannuation trustee to represent 
broader public or political interests as a major shareholder in corporate law is found in 
the enduring judicial significance of one English authority. The 1985 decision of the 
Chancery Court in Cowan v Scargill first suggested the tensions that were likely to 
arise in assessing the proper purposes of pension fund trustees who were required to 
provide for the beneficiaries of the Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme (the Scheme) 
established in the United Kingdom.38 The question for the Court was whether those 
purposes should be considered to be only the financial benefits of the beneficiaries 
(considered apart from any political or other objections that might be raised as to the 
way in which those financial benefits were derived), or whether the trustees’ proper 
purposes in investing the funds of the Scheme might be taken to include the social and 
political purposes of the National Union of Mineworkers at a time of bitter dispute 
between the Union and the British government over mine closures.  
 
In Cowan v Scargill, the Court declared that the proper purposes of the trustees in law 
should be considered only the financial benefits of the trust beneficiaries. The 
Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme had been set up jointly by the National Coal Board 
and the National Union of Mineworkers in order to provide pensions and lump sum 
payments to the widows and children of mineworkers, and payments to workers 
suffering injuries and diseases. The Scheme enjoyed a number of taxation advantages 
in order to provide these benefits. In the supervision of the Scheme, there were 10 
trustees – five of whom were appointed by the National Coal Board and five by the 
Union. The trustees enjoyed wide powers of investment and there was established a 
                                               
38
 Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch. 270 (the Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme Case). 
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Joint Investment Sub-Committee (JISC). The trustees held the power to act by 
majority, but no allowance had been made for a casting vote.  
 
In 1976 there was instituted an initial four-year plan for the investment of the Scheme 
funds, although this was replaced in 1980 by a similar plan permitting three classes of 
investment namely: marketable securities; land; and industrial finance (including 
equities in small listed companies). 
 
In 1982, a further revised plan proposed that an increased proportion of the Scheme 
funds might be invested overseas. Approval by the JISC was sought for this revised 
plan and immediately encountered difficulties. Joe Gormley, the President of the 
Union, had resigned one month earlier and Arthur Scargill had been elected in his 
place as both a Union trustee of the Mineworkers’ Scheme and as the Vice Chair of 
the JISC. At a time of bitter dispute with the British government over mine closures, 
Scargill maintained that, as a point of investment principle, there should be no further 
investments of Scheme funds overseas in any form of energy that competed with 
British coal. Any investment in oil in the United States might be seen as such a 
competing investment. Scargill was supported in this contention by the four trustees 
appointed by the Union, but was opposed by the other five trustees. As a result, the 
board was equally divided and deadlocked on the issue.  
 
The matter came before the Court on the issue of whether the defendants (who were 
the union appointed trustees) were in breach of their fiduciary duties as members of 
the JISC and trustees of the Scheme in their refusal to adopt the Revised 1982 
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Investment Plan. The case took nine days to decide. Of the five defendants, only 
Scargill addressed the Court. He provided a one and a half page affidavit setting out 
the case for the defendants. In his subsequent commentary, the presiding judge noted 
that more difficult issues may have received closer attention in argument had the 
defendants been represented.39 
 
Leaving this to one side, the case was argued on three principal points of law which 
were considered by the Court.40 The defendants did not contest the stated law on these 
points. Firstly, it was argued that the paramount duty of the trustees was to exercise 
their powers in the best interests of the beneficiaries.41 Where the object of the trust is 
to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, as in this case, those best interests 
would be considered normally (but not inevitably) their best financial interests. 
Secondly, in deciding on investments trustees must ignore their own personal views 
and interests and not refrain from making an advantageous investment merely because 
they are personally opposed to the activity involved. At the time of the decision in 
Cowan v Scargill, investments in alcohol, tobacco or armaments sold to South Africa 
at the time of the apartheid regime provided examples of investments to which 
personal objections might have been otherwise raised on this ground. Finally, there 
was the duty of a trustee in  making investments to take such care as an ordinary 
prudent man would take when making an investment for another person for whom he 
                                               
39
 Ibid, 152-153. 
40
 See also, the subsequent commentary on these points offered by the presiding judge, the Rt. Hon. Sir 
Robert Megarry above n 34, 154. 
41
 The ‘convenient phrase’ utilised in the American case of Blankenship v Boyle (1971) 329 F. Supp. 
1089 (Dist. Ct. D.C.) and cited in: Cowan v Scargill (see: above n 34), 292 was the ‘duty of undivided 
loyalty to the beneficiaries’ owed by the trustee.  
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felt morally bound to provide – a requirement reflected in the trustee’s statutory 
covenant under s 52(2)(b) in the SIS Act 1993 (Cth). 
 
The Court saw the question as one of whether these principles were to apply without 
modification in this case. The plaintiffs maintained that the answer to this question 
should be yes; the defendants, no.   
 
In the final result, the Court made the declaration sought by the plaintiffs and the 
defendant trustees were declared in breach of their fiduciary duties in refusing to 
adopt the Revised 1982 Investment Plan (unless that Plan included specific 
prohibitions on investments in oil and other coal alternatives). The effect of this 
decision is still felt today in the primacy of trustee investment decisions for the 
financial benefits of the beneficiaries. An extension of the principle endorsed in the 
case is now found in the statutory acceptance of diversified portfolio management as a 
discharge of the trustee’s legal duties in the exercise of investment powers. 
 
C Trustee’s duties in the exercise of investment powers 
 
A number of provisions found in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth) illustrate the continuing influence of trust law upon superannuation funds and 
their trustees. A ‘superannuation entity’ is defined in s 10 of the Act to mean a 
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regulated superannuation fund, an approved deposit fund, or a pooled superannuation 
trust.42 
 
In the Act, Part 6 sets out the legal responsibilities or ‘covenants’ of the trustee with 
respect to the governing rules that are applicable to superannuation entities. 
Subsection 52(2) sets out the covenants which are deemed to be included in the 
governing rules of a superannuation entity when such covenants are not actually 
included in the rules. It is worth setting out in full the requirements in these covenants 
because there is no mistaking the distinctive obligations of the trustee in safeguarding 
trust property, and in providing the end benefits due to beneficiaries. 
 
The distinctive obligations of the trustee are particularly evident in paragraphs 
52(2)(b) and 52(2)(f). Section 52 states: 
1) If the governing rules of a superannuation entity do not contain covenants to the effect of the 
covenants set out in subsection (2), those governing rules are taken to contain covenants to 
that effect.  
The covenants 
2) The covenants referred to in subsection (1) are the following covenants by the trustee:  
a) to act honestly in all matters concerning the entity; 
b) to exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the entity, the same degree of care, skill 
and diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise in dealing with property 
of another for whom the person felt morally bound to provide; 
c) to ensure that the trustee’s duties and powers are performed and exercised in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries;  
                                               
42
 Interesting issues may arise as to the precise legal status of the pooled superannuation trust. Pooled 
superannuation trusts are constituted as unit trusts and regulated as superannuation entities. However, 
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d) to keep the money and other assets of the entity separate from any money and assets, 
respectively: 
i) that there are held by the trustee personally; or 
ii) that are money or assets, as the case may be, of a standard employer-sponsor, 
or an associate of a standard employer-sponsor, of the entity; 
e) not to enter into any contract, or do anything else, that would prevent the trustee 
from, or hinder the trustee in, properly performing or exercising the trustee’s 
functions and powers; 
f) to formulate and give effect to an investment strategy that has regard to the whole of 
the circumstances of the entity including, but not limited to, the following: 
i) the risk involved in making, holding and realising, and the likely return 
from, the entity’s investments having regard to its objectives and its 
expected cash flow requirements;  
ii) the composition of the entity’s investments as a whole including the extent 
to which the investments are diverse or involve the entity in being exposed 
to risks from inadequate diversification; 
iii) the liquidity of the entity’s investments having regard to its expected cash 
flow requirements;  
iv) the ability of the entity to discharge its existing and prospective liabilities;  
g) if there are any reserves of the entity – to formulate and to give effect to a strategy for 
their prudential management, consistent with the entity’s investment strategy and its 
capacity to discharge its liabilities (whether actual or contingent) as and when they 
fall due; 
h) to allow a beneficiary access to any prescribed information or any prescribed 
documents 
 
                                                                                                                                       
they are also, in the eyes of major institutions, an investment product.  
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In these provisions it is quite clear that the essential legal obligations of the 
superannuation trustee, which will be generally constituted as a corporation, remain 
those of a legal trustee. The duties imposed upon the superannuation trustee clearly 
differ in fundamental ways from those imposed upon a director under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). For example, under the SIS Act 1993 (Cth) the trustee is 
required to act ‘honestly’ in all matters relating to the superannuation entity (s 
52(2)(a)). By contrast, the former duty upon corporate directors to act ‘honestly’ has 
been re-formulated as a duty to act ‘in good faith, for proper purposes and in the 
interests of the company’ – a formula more closely aligned to the purposes of 
directors, more easily enforceable through an enhanced range of civil penalty 
provisions and more attuned to the demands of modern corporate governance.43 
Similarly, while the superannuation trustee under the Act is required to perform duties 
and exercise powers ‘in the best interests of the beneficiaries’ (subs 52(2)(c)) the 
corporate director is required to act ‘in the interest of the company’. Thus, the legal 
obligation owed by the superannuation trustee to the ‘members’ of the fund, rather 
than to the fund ‘as a whole’, is conceived as a personal obligation of the trustee 
rather than as a corporate obligation.44 
 
The seemingly onerous obligations imposed upon the superannuation trustee may be 
exceedingly difficult for the trustee to discharge in practice as a major investor and 
shareholder. The trustee’s obligation in s 52(2)(b) to exercise the same care and 
                                               
43
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 181. 
44
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 52(2)(c). This obligation seems particularly 
onerous when the trustee must represent both the political interests of employers and employees in 
industry superannuation funds, and the financial interests of members. In law, the latter interests should 
generally prevail. See: Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch. 270. 
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diligence ‘... as an ordinary prudent person might exercise in dealing with the property 
of another for whom the trustee felt morally bound to provide’ reflects a personal 
expectation of the trustee which may be unrealistic for a corporate trustee responsible 
for investing large superannuation funds – given the high dependence of the trustee on 
the investment manager.45  
 
There are tensions here between traditional concepts of corporate and trustee 
responsibilities. At the heart of these tensions lies the fundamental difficulty posed by 
a superannuation trustee meeting onerous personal obligations to beneficiaries in 
safeguarding trust property while also adopting a corporate-style approach to risk 
management in pursuing returns from higher performing investments in the market.46 
This difficulty is now highlighted in s 52(2)(f) which enables the trustee to answer its 
investment obligations through the formulation of a strategy founded upon investment 
diversity and portfolio management theory.  In the requirements for the appointment 
of investment managers the SIS Act 1993 (Cth) envisages some separation between 
the legal ownership of the superannuation fund and the management of the fund as an 
investment.47  In these provisions however, while the superannuation trustee is 
envisaged the dominant party in the contractual relationship with the investment 
                                               
45
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 52(2)(b). Such an obligation upon the 
superannuation trustee seems particularly unrealistic when the trustee is heavily dependent upon 
investment products such as master trusts or pooled superannuation trusts, when making an investment. 
The same point arose in considering the legal responsibilities of the trustee in the former public unit 
trust.  
46
 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 52(2)(f). 
47
 Section 124 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) provides that investment 
managers must be appointed only in writing, and s 125 provides that the investment manager must be 
an incorporated body. Section 116 provides that any agreement between the trustee of a superannuation 
entity and the investment manager of that entity must not exempt the investment manager from liability 
for negligence, nor limit the extent of the manager’s liability in this regard. Section 122 provides that 
an investment manager must not appoint or engage a custodian without the trustee’s consent.  
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manager, the reality will often be that the trustee depends upon the expertise of the 
manager and the manager’s products – a reality analogous to the relationship between 
the trustee and management company in former public unit trusts. 48 
 
The analogy with public unit trusts is an interesting one, since the investment manager 
today is increasingly likely to be a corporate entity responsible for managed 
investments.49 This entity is itself a single legal corporation in which the separate 
functional roles of the trustee and the management company in former public unit 
trusts were merged in 1998. The single corporate entity responsible for managed 
investments was conceived as a result of the difficulties found in articulating the 
separate roles and responsibilities of trustees and management companies in former 
public unit trusts.50 The abolition of the trustee in 1998, and the compression of the 
trustee’s responsibilities into the constitution of the new corporate entity, has seen the 
former trustee’s duties in trust law incorporated in the governance of the entity.  
 
IV CONTINUING TENSIONS IN THE ROLES OF SUPERANNUATION 
FUND TRUSTEES AND INVESTMENT MANAGERS AS 
CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS 
 
It may be appreciated from the discussion above that developments in the Australian 
financial market since the FSR in 1997 have essentially followed the course predicted 
                                               
48
 Ford and Worthington, above n 27. 
49
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Chapter 5C.  
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by Clark although the institutional role of market intermediaries has perhaps 
diminished. In an attempt to offer greater consumer choice in the investment of their 
superannuation savings, the members of funds now have more direct access to 
markets through a widening range of investment products which has blurred the lines 
between intermediaries and their products.  
 
The effect of these developments has been much the same as Clark predicted, 
however, since the members of funds have become increasingly removed from any 
investment of their funds that might ultimately be made in corporations. As a result, 
they now depend substantially upon superannuation trustees and corporate investment 
managers as the owners and controllers of their capital to protect their interests in 
corporate governance. For this reason it is important to consider closely the powers 
and responsibilities of trustees and investment managers as major corporate 
shareholders and the role each might play in corporate governance.  
 
As has been seen, although there are now significant borrowings from trust and 
corporate concepts on each side, it is still possible at certain points to identify the 
essentially different roles played in practice by the superannuation trustee (as the 
ultimate legal ‘owner’ of shares) and the investment manager (as the ‘controller’ of 
those shares).51 These different roles are suggested in the ways in which the ‘trustee’ 
                                                                                                                                       
50
 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Managed Investments Bill 1997 (Cth) cited the breakdown of 
market information available to the trustee as one compelling reason for establishing a single 
responsible entity in the place of the trustee and management company in former public unit trusts.  
51
 It should be noted, referring to Figure 1, that this analysis ignores the important role played in 
practice by the ‘custodian’ as the legal ‘member’ of the corporation. The custodian acts generally under 
the instructions of the trustee or investment manager in issues of corporate governance and difficult 
issues arise as to the exercise of voting rights at the meeting. This provides a further ‘agency cost’ to 
trustee participation, but one that has been ignored for the purposes of this article.   
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character of the superannuation fund trustee and the ‘corporate’ character of the 
investment manager are emphasised in the two different legal forms. Legally, the 
superannuation trustee remains a trustee although it is often constituted as a 
corporation for the purposes of the SIS Act 1993 (Cth) while the corporate responsible 
entity is essentially a corporation, albeit one with distinctive trustee characteristics,52 
and more refined features of corporate governance.53 In practice, while the 
superannuation trustee must consider the overall investment strategy, the responsible 
entity is focussed upon investment returns and is likely to be closer to the market and 
corporate management in the case of corporate investments.  
 
For a period in the 1990s, the active role of United States pension fund trustees was 
greatly encouraged in the interests of overseeing management and promoting superior 
market performance among investee corporations.54 This active role was even 
considered one which might extend to trustees playing a more active role on corporate 
boards and in the oversight of management. This was a time of high expectations for 
the pension (or superannuation) fund trustee. However, any expectation that the 
trustee might play such a role has largely faded. In 1998, Professor Black summarised 
                                               
52
 For example, s 602FC(2) provides that the property of an investment scheme managed by the 
responsible entity is to be held on trust for scheme members. Likewise, ss 601 FC(1) and 601FD(1) 
stipulate that the duties of the responsible entity and its officers respectively are to act in the best 
interest of  scheme members as distinct from any corporate or scheme entity. 
53
 An example being the requirement in Part 5C.5 that a compliance committee be established when 
less than half the directors of the responsible entity are ‘external’ directors. Section 601JC endows the 
compliance committee with a novel statutory role in reporting to ASIC if it believes the responsible 
entity has not taken action, or does not propose taking action, with respect to breaches in relation to the 
management of a scheme.            
54
 The leaders in this respect were a group of active public employee pension funds such as the 
Californian Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS). In 1998 CalPERS announced a strategic 
alliance with Hermes Lens and other large institutional investors who were particularly keen to monitor 
corporate performance and remuneration issues. See: S Davis, ‘CalPERS, Hermes Ally’ (1998) 2(43) 
Global Proxy Watch 43. Since then, CalPERS has played an active role in the International Corporate 
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the reasons for this and the failure of pension fund trustees as active shareholders in 
the United States in these terms: 
A small number of American institutional investors, mostly public pension plans, spend a 
trivial amount of money on overt activism efforts. They don’t conduct proxy fights, and rarely 
try to elect their candidates to the board of directors. Legal rules, agency costs within the 
institutions, information costs, collective action problems, and limited institutional 
competence are all plausible partial explanations for this relative lack of activity. The 
currently available evidence, taken as a whole, is consistent with the proposition that the 
institutions achieve the efforts of firm performance that one might expect from this level of 
effort – namely, not much.55 
 
Not only has it become difficult to see the trustee playing a truly active role as a major 
shareholder in the companies in which it invests, it is becoming difficult to define the 
roles that superannuation trustees and investment managers might play in corporate 
monitoring. Apart from the role routinely played annually in monitoring corporate 
performance and management remuneration, public intervention by superannuation 
trustees in corporate governance is becoming more sporadic and more muted. Perhaps 
the last real example of such intervention in Australia occurred in 2004 when the 
Australian Council of Superannuation Funds sought and obtained assurances from 
Newscorp Ltd that hard-won features of corporate governance adopted by Newscorp 
                                                                                                                                       
Governance Network (ICGN), reflecting the close identification of the ICGN’s approach to corporate 
governance with that of CalPERS and other active funds.  
55
 Extract cited from: ‘Recent Surveys of Corporate Governance’, Appendix A in the Conference 
Board’s 2000 update: The Link Between Corporate Governance and Performance: Year 2000 Update, 
(New York: The Conference Board, 2000). 
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Ltd in Australia would continue to be respected by the corporation when it re-located 
to the United States.56 
 
In other respects, corporate investment managers have sometimes appeared to 
exercise considerable influence in their dealings with corporate management. They 
have also appeared central to the control of major shareholdings in major takeovers. 
This appeared to be the case, for example, in the context of the proposed bid by the 
Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) for rival Alinta Ltd in 2006, and the 
subsequent conditional bid made by Alinta Ltd for AGL. As a result of this bid, Alinta 
came to hold more than 20% of AGL and in June 2006 both companies entered a 
Merger Implementation Agreement with a view to merging their infrastructure assets. 
With Alinta holding in excess of 20% of AGL and the merger of their infrastructure 
assets clearly in mind, an issue arose concerning the control that Alinta might 
potentially achieve in its positioning with AGL through its relevant interest in AGL’s 
30% holding of the issued units in the Australian Pipeline Trust (APT) and its own 
subsequent acquisition of a further 10% of units in the APT.57  The APT was 
strategically significant since AGL’s gas pipeline transmission assets were vested in 
this trust. The APT also constituted a managed investment scheme of which AGL was 
deemed to be the responsible entity. Between 16 August 2006 and 22 August 2006, 
                                               
56Evidence of the active interest of the Australian Council of Superannuation Funds in the governance 
and management of News Corp was seen in the Council’s actions in 2004 and 2006. In seeking to 
relocate to the United States in October 2004, News Corp was forced by a group of shareholders, led by 
the Council, to maintain the same standards of corporate governance that the company had adopted in 
Australia. In 2006, twelve investor groups, including six Australian superannuation funds, protested 
that News Corp had breached its 2004 undertakings to shareholders by proposing the extension of 
‘poison pill’ arrangements which would enable the company to block potential takeovers. News Corp 
agreed to the demands of this group of shareholders and to putting the proposed arrangements to the 
general meeting for resolution by shareholders. See: ‘Murdoch Backflip on Poison Pill Vote’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 8-9 April 2006, 41.  
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Alinta acquired approximately 10% of the issued units in APT through its wholly-
owned subsidiary Trewas Pty Ltd, prompting AGL to apply to the Takeovers Panel 
seeking a declaration of unacceptable circumstances because of the effect that Alinta’s 
acquisition of up to 40% of units in the APT might have on its control or potential 
control of the trust.  
 
The Alinta case suggests the extent to which the control of investment vehicles 
constituted as managed investments schemes under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
such as the APT, may become significant to the control of corporations in which they 
invest. 
  
Article 10 of the CTC should be repealed and the requirement of publicity of trust 
property should be re-examined. It may be justifiable to impose a registration 
requirement on commercial trusts because the ‘caveat venditor’ doctrine is entrenched 
in civilian commercial laws and there is no duty on the part of the buyer to investigate 
the title to property or the qualification of the seller. The buyer should have all 
information available to him before dealing with a commercial trust.  Disclosure of 
information is necessary in business. Many trusts are, however, more like private 
arrangements between the settlor and the trustee (in commercial trusts) or between the 
trustee and the beneficiaries (in private trusts). The private character of these trusts 
cannot and should not be compulsorily changed into a public character. Any 
requirement of publicity for trusts should be confined within a reasonable scope and 
                                                                                                                                       
57
 Re Australian Pipeline Trust 01 [2006] ATP 27, 26. 
64 CANBERRA LAW REVIEW [(2011) 
 
should not distract from the primary aim of a trust law, which is to establish a rigorous 
regime of fiduciary accountability.            
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The heavy reliance of superannuation trustees upon investment managers and their 
market products suggests that three long-standing legal questions may need further 
consideration. These three questions are firstly, whether the trustee’s reliance upon 
diversification and portfolio investment  in the investment of large superannuation 
funds provides a wholly satisfactory answer to the trustee’s legal obligations in 
making corporate investments; secondly, whether the trustee and investment manager 
are now truly able to exercise their investment powers ‘in a fiduciary way’;  and 
thirdly, whether the cross-over of corporate and trust forms within the markets 
sufficiently distinguishes the arguably different roles that might now be assumed by 
the trustee owner and corporate investment manager in corporate governance. 
 
A consideration of Clark’s capitalism in the Australian context suggests that there is 
some discernable evidence of a continuing separation between the ‘ownership’ role of 
the trustee and the potentially ‘controlling’ role of the investment manager in the 
management of superannuation funds. While there is now an extensive mixing of trust 
and corporate forms within the market, the separation between ownership and control 
begins with important differences in the constitution and legal duties of the 
superannuation trustee and the investment manager. It is reinforced in the effective 
dependence of the superannuation trustee upon the investment manager and the 
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manager’s products in making investment decisions. This separation between the 
ownership and control of funds in the financial markets holds particular significance 
for the investment of superannuation funds in corporate shareholdings.  
 
There are significant tensions here between traditional concepts of corporate and 
trustee responsibilities. At the heart of these tensions lies the fundamental difficulty 
posed by a superannuation trustee meeting onerous personal obligations to 
beneficiaries in safeguarding trust property while also adopting a corporate-style 
approach to risk management in pursuing returns from higher performing investments 
in the market. As beneficial owners become more removed from the management of 
funds and from participation in corporations, the roles of the trustee and investment 
manager in corporate governance becomes more important. These underlying tensions 
suggest that the expectations of major trustee shareholders and investment managers 
in monitoring corporate governance might be undermined by the different 
perspectives of the trustee owner and the investment manager in investing 
superannuation funds.  
 
 
 
